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CONSTITUTIONALISM AND COERCION 
Frederick Schauer* 
Abstract: A common understanding of constitutionalism sees a constitu-
tion as a device for keeping self-serving, corrupt, misguided, incompe-
tent, power-hungry, or otherwise bad officials from doing bad things. But 
an alternative vision of constitutionalism recognizes the role of a constitu-
tion in imposing second-order constraints on the well-intended and often 
wise policies and decisions of even good officials, and doing so in the ser-
vice of a range of longer-term values often likely to be slighted given the 
incentives of day-to-day politics and policy making. Using a series of 
prominent Supreme Court cases as a springboard, this Article, the written 
version of the Clough Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence at Boston 
College Law School, develops this alternative vision of constitutionalism 
and the role of a constitution. The Article then suggests that such a role 
for a constitution is especially in need of strong devices for coercive en-
forcement of constitutional constraints, stronger than those commonly in 
place in the United States today. 
Introduction 
 Government is not very popular these days. In the United States, 
and to a significant extent elsewhere, trust in government appears to be 
extraordinarily low. And the degree of distrust of government is 
matched by, and arguably caused by, distrust of the governors—the of-
ficials who collectively constitute the government. On a daily basis, we 
hear and read about officials who take bribes, provide jobs for their rel-
atives, grant sinecures to their friends, favor their donors, and put re-
election and political ambition above the needs and interests of their 
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constituents. Indeed, although experience is often thought to be a val-
uable job credential, it is not so in politics, where extensive political or 
public service experience seems far more often to be an electoral liabil-
ity than a political asset. 
 In this environment, James Madison’s memorable words in The Fed-
eralist No. 51— “If men were angels, no government would be neces-
sary” —resonate perhaps even more than when Madison wrote them.1 
Especially in recent years, this Madisonian idea has informed a great 
deal of American constitutional thinking.2 Constitutions exist to keep 
bad governors from doing bad things, it seems commonly to be as-
sumed, and thus constitutions serve principally to protect the public 
and the public interest from the actions of officials that are far too rarely 
inspired by a genuine commitment to the public interest. Three dec-
ades ago, for example, Cass Sunstein argued that a proper understand-
ing of the U.S. Constitution—in significant part Madison’s Constitu-
tion—would recognize the central importance of guarding against the 
“naked preferences” of the populace and its representatives.3 As a con-
sequence, he argued, it is necessary to entrench principles of constitu-
tional interpretation that would expose and diminish the importance of 
preferences devoted to the private interests of factions and officials, ra-
ther than to the genuine public interest.4 
 Sunstein’s views embody a common view of constitutionalism as a 
way of keeping incompetent, misguided, corrupt, ignorant, or other-
wise bad officials from doing bad things.5 And certainly there is much 
                                                                                                                      
1 The Federalist No. 51, at 290 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
2 Perhaps “Hobbesian” would be a better description of the idea’s provenance. See gen-
erally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651) (arguing that government exists to counteract people’s selfish instincts). 
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 
1689–93, 1730–32 (1984). I make no claim that this position represents—or does not rep-
resent—Sunstein’s current views. 
4 See id. at 1730–32. Madison also stressed the government’s role in controlling fac-
tions. See generally The Federalist No. 10 ( James Madison). 
5 On the American people’s distrust of government and the belief that, if unchecked 
by constitutional principles, government actors will act self-interestedly rather than for the 
public good, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Re-
view 88–101 (1980); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 19 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Engagement with the 
Affordable Care Act: Why Rational Basis Analysis Falls Short, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 931, 931 
(2012); Marci A. Hamilton, The First Amendment’s Challenge Function and the Confusion in the 
Supreme Court’s Contemporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 81, 91 n.34 (1994); 
Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 495, 516–17 (2001); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-
Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 917 (2005). 
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in American constitutional thought and history to support such a view.6 
The Constitution has kept racist officials from effectuating racist poli-
cies;7 it has prevented rogue law enforcement officials from railroading 
innocent suspects;8 it has prevented officials from clinging to out-
moded and (morally and empirically) mistaken gender stereotypes;9 
and it has prevented presidents from using the powers of the office to 
punish political enemies and attempt to cover up the evidence of their 
misdeeds.10 And this is only the tip of the iceberg. 
 This vision of constitutionalism—the constitution of distrust—is 
focused on officials who do or might act badly. “Badly” is a loose term, 
but it encompasses the officials who act for reasons of self-interest ra-
ther than public interest; who are corrupt in a more direct sense; who 
use their offices to pursue obviously immoral practices; who seek to in-
crease their power and disable those who might threaten it; who use 
their official power to embody racist and other blatantly discriminatory 
policies; and who in various other ways fit Madison’s characterization. 
Such officials may not always be “devils,” but nor are they “angels” in 
Madison’s sense. The constitution of distrust is thus a constitution 
aimed principally at preventing such people from pursuing the forego-
ing agendas. The constitution of distrust is a constitution designed to 
keep bad people from doing bad things. 
 There is, however, an alternative vision of constitutionalism and of 
the function of constitutions in most modern democracies, a vision that 
views constitutionalism as imposing second-order constraints on the 
first-order policy decisions made by reasonable, well-meaning officials. 
This alternative vision and the constitution of distrust are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive. But although this alternative vision captures 
much of our constitutional tradition, its implications—especially for the 
                                                                                                                      
6 See generally Gary Wills, A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of 
Government (1999). 
7 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that state anti-miscegenation 
statutes violated the Equal Protection and Due Processes Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 16–17 (1958) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited suspension of a school integration plan). 
8 See Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecu-
tions Go Wrong 19–20, 36–40 (2011) (examining the Constitution’s role in protecting 
against the use of false confessions at trial). 
9 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (holding that the exclusion of 
women from a public college violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
10 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686, 713 (1974) (holding that executive privi-
lege did not protect President Nixon from producing tapes and documents subpoenaed in 
a criminal prosecution). 
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coercive sanctions we choose to ensure constitutional compliance—are 
often ignored. 
I. Nine Cases 
 To support the claims just briefly summarized, and thus to explain 
the alternative vision of constitutionalism, I want to examine a series of 
cases. This series is neither a random nor a representative sample. Ra-
ther, it is a series of carefully selected illustrations of an alternative con-
ception of constitutional law—or, perhaps more accurately, an alterna-
tive role that constitutional law often plays. I begin with cases involving 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment, and I then move to 
several cases involving other aspects of constitutional law. Although the 
phenomenon these cases illustrate is by no means restricted to the First 
Amendment, it is not surprising, for reasons that I will explain, that the 
phenomenon surfaces so frequently in the context of the First 
Amendment. 
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio 
 In 1966, Clarence Brandenburg was the leader of a southern Ohio 
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan.11 In that capacity, and in the presence of a 
television camera team he invited, Brandenburg gave a speech to a rally 
of Klan leaders on a farm in Hamilton County, Ohio.12 Brandenburg 
and his audience were attired in hoods and other Klan regalia, and they 
carried weapons—including a rifle, pistol, and shotgun.13 The group 
burned a cross, and while the cross was burning, Brandenburg spoke to 
the audience.14 In his speech, he threatened acts of “revengeance” 
against African-Americans15 and Jews, and urged that all African-
Americans be sent to Africa and all Jews to Israel, by force if necessary.16 
 The Klan rally, the weapons, the burning cross, and the threats— 
especially in the tense and racially charged atmosphere of mid-1960s 
southern Ohio—alarmed local authorities, who charged Brandenburg 
with the crime of criminal syndicalism under the Ohio Criminal Syndi-
                                                                                                                      
11 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–45 (1969) (per curiam). 
12 Id. at 445–46. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 447. This was not the label that Brandenburg actually used. See id. 
16 Id. at 446–47. 
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calism Act.17 That statute, enacted during the 1919 Red Scare, was orig-
inally designed for use against Communists, Socialists, and others who 
advocated “crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism 
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,” or who vol-
untarily assembled for such advocacy.18 Brandenburg was convicted at 
trial, and his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio.19 In 
a unanimous decision, whose per curiam opinion remains the founda-
tion of American free speech jurisprudence regarding advocacy of or 
incitement to violence to this day,20 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction, holding that the First Amendment bars criminal convic-
tions for advocacy of even unlawful or violent conduct unless “such ad-
vocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action.”21 
B. Collin v. Smith 
 In 1977, Frank Collin and his fellow members of the National So-
cialist Party of America—the American Nazi Party for short—made 
plans to hold a march celebrating Nazism and glorifying the Nazi re-
gime.22 They selected as a location the town of Skokie, Illinois,23 the 
selection based plainly on the fact that Skokie, at the time, was home to 
a large Jewish population, approximately 5000 of whom were survivors 
of the Holocaust.24 In an effort to protect its residents—especially those 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13 (West 
1966), invalidated by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
18 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448; see 1919 Ohio Laws 189, invalidated by Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: Criminal 
Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917–1927, 85 Or. L. Rev. 649, 696–
700 (2007) (discussing the Red Scare of 1919–1920 and its causal effect on the enactment 
of criminal syndicalism statutes). 
19 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. 
20 Id. at 447–49; see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (citing 
Brandenburg as an example of a content-based restriction on speech); Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (same); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2670 (2011) (distinguishing the incitement in Brandenburg from pharmaceutical 
marketing’s influence on physicians’ treatment decisions). Brandenburg’s scope may not 
extend to tort actions against speakers and publishers when their speech is a foreseeable 
cause of harm committed by others. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 255–56 
(4th Cir. 1997); David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 957, 
970–74 (2002); Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Test Apply in Media Vio-
lence Tort Cases?, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1, 43 (2000). 
21 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
22 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. 1978). 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
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who were close to Holocaust survivors or were themselves Holocaust 
survivors—from the anguish the Nazi march was almost certain to 
cause, the town officials sought to block the march.25 
 In both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
however, the town’s efforts were rebuffed on free speech grounds.26 
The courts relied on Brandenburg and several post-Brandenburg Supreme 
Court cases27 emphasizing that viewpoint-based restrictions on parades, 
marches, and demonstrations were constitutionally impermissible,28 
and that offense or anguish to unwilling or inadvertent viewers was in-
sufficient justification for restricting speech in the public forum.29 Al-
though the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in the federal case was 
technically not a decision on the merits,30 the events attracted so much 
national publicity that the Court’s refusal to give the case a full hearing 
on the merits was widely understood—and presumably understood by 
the Court—as an implicit statement that the town’s attempt to restrict 
the march was so plainly unconstitutional that no plenary considera-
tion by the Supreme Court was necessary. 
C. United States v. Stevens 
 In 2010, the Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens invalidated a 
federal statute prohibiting the creation, sale, or possession of films and 
                                                                                                                      
25 See id. at 21; Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 629, 629 (1985); David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amend-
ment Under Attack by Its Friends, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 761, 762 (1978). 
26 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207–09 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978); Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 22. The state proceeding was preceded by U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions at 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) and 434 U.S. 1327, 1327–28 (1977), which re-
solved certain preliminary issues before remanding back to the Illinois Supreme Court—
including an application for a stay of a preliminary injunction. 
27 See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1202–03; Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 23–26. 
28 See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality 
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 26–28 (1975) (arguing 
that Mosley adopted the principle of equal liberty of expression); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 203–07 (1983) (discussing 
Mosley’s analysis of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech); Susan H. Williams, Content 
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 624–28 (1991) (same). 
29 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See generally William Cohen, A Look 
Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1595 (1987) (summarizing Cohen and subse-
quent cases). 
30 See House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945) (“[A] denial of certiorari by this Court 
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998). 
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other like material depicting cruelty to animals.31 Stevens had made 
and sold video recordings of dog-fighting as part of his own illegal dog-
fighting business.32 The statute at issue, however, was aimed at even 
more overt filmed acts of cruelty to animals—including crushing pup-
pies and kittens under the heels of actors, presumably for the pleasure 
of the small subculture for whom such images provide psychic and sex-
ual stimulation.33 
 In an 8–1 decision, with only Justice Samuel Alito dissenting, the 
Court held the statute unconstitutional.34 Although the Court recog-
nized the plausibility of extending the New York v. Ferber rationale for 
regulating non-obscene child pornography35 to depictions of animal 
cruelty involving actual cruelty to actual animals,36 the Court neverthe-
less refused to do so.37 As a result, the statute at issue in Stevens became 
merely another example of an attempt to regulate non-obscene images 
because of their content,38 and the Court’s conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality followed from that finding.39 
D. Snyder v. Phelps 
 In 2011, one year after Stevens, the Court in Snyder v. Phelps was 
again faced with an attempted restriction of what most observers would 
consider to be genuinely appalling communicative conduct.40 The Rev-
erend Fred Phelps and the members of his Westboro Baptist Church 
believed that military deaths were God’s punishment for American tol-
eration of homosexuality.41 Because of this belief, Phelps and his fol-
lowers engaged in the systematic practice of picketing military funerals, 
                                                                                                                      
31 559 U.S. 460, 464, 482 (2010); see 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), invalidated 
by United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
32 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 466. 
33 See 18 U.S.C. § 48; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465–66; 145 Cong. Rec. 10,685 (1999) (“Sick 
criminals are taking advantage of . . . the lack of federal law on animal cruelty videos. This 
is a serious problem. Thousands of these videos are being sold. Thousands of dollars are 
being made. . . . This must be stopped!”). 
34 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482. 
35 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753–66 (1982). See generally Frederick Schauer, 
Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 285 (exploring the 
doctrinal implications of Ferber). 
36 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
37 Id. at 470–72. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 468, 481–82. 
40 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
41 See id.; Gina Davis, At Carroll Funeral, a National Protest, Balt. Sun, Mar. 11, 2006, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-03-11/news/bal-te.md.marine11mar11_1_military-
funerals-westboro-baptist-church-shirley-phelps-roper. 
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including that of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, a heterosexual ma-
rine not previously known to the picketers.42 At Snyder’s funeral, the 
picketers held signs, many of them clearly visible to those attending the 
funeral, containing slogans such as: “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” 
“God Hates Fags,” and “Thank God for 9/11.”43 The signs and the 
picketers had plainly caused distress to Corporal Snyder’s family, who 
brought a tort action under Maryland law for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.44 
 In another 8–1 decision, with Justice Stephen Breyer concurring 
and again only Justice Alito dissenting, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the $5 million damage award,45 primarily because the picketing was re-
lated to a matter of public concern.46 Because of this, the Court held, 
the First Amendment prevented Maryland from applying the common 
law of intentional infliction of emotional distress to the conduct of 
Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church.47 Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice John Roberts held that the harm caused by speech on mat-
ters of public concern was a necessary byproduct of the First Amend-
ment’s commitment to open public discourse.48 Such speech could 
therefore not form the basis for criminal prosecution or civil damages.49 
E. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 
 Also in 2011, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Su-
preme Court invalidated a California statute restricting minors’ access 
to certain violent interactive video games.50 These games, which typi-
cally gave users the virtual experience of engaging in rape, murder, and 
other violent and illegal activities,51 were thought by the California leg-
islature to increase the likelihood that the individuals who played them 
would engage in the actual activities depicted in the games.52 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213; Davis, supra note 41. 
43 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213; Davis, supra note 41. 
44 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
45 Id. at 1212, 1214, 1219–20; see Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 597 (D. Md. 
2008) (issuing the award). 
46 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215–17. 
47 See id. at 1219. 
48 See id. at 1220. 
49 See id. at 1219–20. For a fuller analysis of the case, see Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) 
and the First Amendment, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 87–90. 
50 131 S. Ct. at 2732–33, 2741–42; see Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009), in-
validated by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
51 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. 
52 Id. at 2738–39; see 2005 Cal. Stat. 4920. 
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 The purveyors of the video games challenged the statute, and the 
Court, with only Justices Breyer and Clarence Thomas dissenting, held 
the California law unconstitutional.53 Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority 
opinion characterized the statute as imposing a content-based restric-
tion on non-obscene material,54 and the Court refused to create a new 
exception to this by then well-settled First Amendment proposition.55 
F. Palmore v. Sidoti 
 Turning from the First Amendment to the Fourteenth, and from 
freedom of speech to equal protection, consider the 1984 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Palmore v. Sidoti.56 The underlying dispute was a cus-
tody battle between a divorced white couple.57 By the time of the trial 
court’s decision, the wife had begun living with an African-American 
man, whom she later married.58 The Florida trial judge and the court-
appointed counselor seemed to believe that a child raised in a mixed-
race household in that community would confront more pressures, 
stresses, social stigmatization, and other difficulties than one not so situ-
ated, and on that basis, the judge awarded custody to the husband.59 
 In the Supreme Court, the losing spouse claimed that taking race 
into account in making a custody decision was a plain violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, and the Court agreed.60 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger noted that even if the 
judge had acted entirely in good faith and with no racial animus, and 
even if the judge was empirically right about the consequences to the 
child, the virtually absolute mandates of the Equal Protection Clause 
made race an impermissible basis for a custody decision.61 
G. Orr v. Orr 
 Domestic relations were also at issue in Orr v. Orr, which the Su-
preme Court decided in 1979.62 An Alabama statute provided that hus-
                                                                                                                      
53 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733, 2741–42, 2751, 2761. 
54 Id. at 2733–34. 
55 Id. On the First Amendment protections of depictions of violence, see generally 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
56 See 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984). 
57 Id. at 430. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 431. 
60 See id. at 431–32. 
61 See id. at 430, 432, 434. 
62 See 440 U.S. 268, 270 (1979). 
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bands, but not wives, could be required to pay alimony regardless of the 
particular financial circumstances of husband and wife at the time of 
divorce.63 The statute was apparently motivated by a desire to assist 
women and was seemingly based on the statistically sound conclusion 
that gender was a reliable, if not perfect, proxy for actual need.64 
 In a decision that drew no dissenters on the merits,65 the Supreme 
Court struck down the statute.66 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing 
for the majority, concluded that even a sound statistical basis could not 
justify the gender disparity.67 Further, the Court concluded that a con-
cern for the likely needs of women could not justify the failure to con-
duct individualized and gender-neutral assessments of actual needs in 
particular cases.68 
H. Hammon v. Indiana 
 The recent spate of Supreme Court cases dealing with the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment may be less familiar to con-
stitutionalists not conversant with questions of evidence or criminal 
procedure, but that does not make them any less important.69 And 
most relevant here is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Ham-
mon v. Indiana.70 In Hammon, a woman and her daughter had been the 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Ala. Code §§ 30-2-51 to -53 (1975), invalidated by Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); 
Orr, 440 U.S. at 270. 
64 See Orr, 440 U.S. at 270. 
65 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William Rehnquist dis-
sented on procedural grounds, but did not reach the underlying merits of the issue. See id. 
at 285–300. 
66 See id. at 283. 
67 See id. at 281. 
68 Id. at 281–82. 
69 For examples of recent Confrontation Clause cases, see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709–10 (2011) (holding that a forensic laboratory report identifying the 
defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was inadmissible, where the prosecution did not 
call as a witness the analyst who signed the report); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 
1150 (2011) (holding that statements made with the primary purpose of “enabl[ing] po-
lice assistance to meet an ongoing emergency” were admissible); Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009) (holding that a forensic laboratory report identifying a 
substance as cocaine was inadmissible); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 355, 377 (2008) 
(holding that the California Supreme Court’s theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not 
an exception to the Confrontation Clause); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004) (holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant). 
70 See 547 U.S. 813, 829–32 (2006). Hammon was decided along with Davis v. Washing-
ton, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), but the facts of Hammon are more relevant for my purposes here 
than are those of Davis. 
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victims of domestic violence by the same man.71 During one incident, 
the woman called the police, who arrived and interviewed the woman 
on the front porch of the family home shortly after the precipitating 
incident.72 The police officer took the woman’s statement and pro-
ceeded to initiate a domestic violence prosecution.73 When the case 
came to trial, the woman did not appear.74 As is often and increasingly 
the case, both the police and the prosecutor sought to proceed against 
the perpetrator anyway, using the woman’s front porch statement as the 
principal prosecution evidence.75 
 Although the evidence was admissible against a hearsay objection 
under the excited utterance exception,76 the Supreme Court neverthe-
less held, in an 8–1 decision, that the use of the statement violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against 
him.77 Where the evidence was in some way testimonial, as it was here, 
the Court held that the existence of the excited utterance or any other 
longstanding hearsay exception was not sufficient to deprive the de-
fendant of what would otherwise be his right to confront the prosecu-
tion’s chief witness.78 
I. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias 
 Finally, consider the seemingly less morally consequential 1984 
Supreme Court decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.79 Among Ha-
waii’s many unique products is wine made from pineapples.80 But as 
most aficionados of wine made from grapes may suspect, pineapple 
wine has a difficult time competing in the marketplace with wine made 
                                                                                                                      
71 See 547 U.S. at 819–20. 
72 Id. at 819. 
73 Id. at 819–20. 
74 See id. at 820. Her nonappearance may have been due to fear or the economic or 
psychological dependency that causes many victims of domestic violence to be reluctant to 
pursue their cases in court. See Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 
New Eng. L. Rev. 603, 610–11 (1994) (explaining why battered women choose to remain 
in abusive relationships); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering: 
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 Wash L. Rev. 267, 279–85 (1985) (same). 
75 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 820; see Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Bat-
tering Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 Tex. J. Women & L. 89, 96 (1997) 
(observing an increase in this phenomenon). 
76 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 821. On excited utterances generally, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) 
and accompanying Advisory Committee commentary. 
77 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 834. 
78 Id. at 821–22; 829–32. 
79 See 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
80 See id. at 265; see, e.g., Pineapple, MauiWine, http://www.mauiwine.com/pineapple/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
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from grapes and originating in places such as France, Italy, or Califor-
nia.81 So in order to assist a local and struggling industry dominated by 
indigenous Hawaiians, the legislature of Hawaii granted pineapple wine 
a tax break unavailable to other varieties of wine.82 
 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that Hawaii’s differential 
taxes explicitly designed to help a local industry represented clear pro-
tectionism and constituted a clear violation of the dormant commerce 
clause.83 As students of the dormant commerce clause well know, the 
Supreme Court made absolutely no new law in so holding.84 Even Ha-
waii’s claim that the pineapple-wine industry was struggling was to no 
avail, and the well-entrenched prohibition on explicit or intentional 
economic protectionism determined the outcome.85 
II. Easy Cases 
 These nine cases, doctrinally diverse as they are, share three fea-
tures in common. First, they were, as Supreme Court cases go, easy cas-
es. Although truly easy cases may never get to the Court at all,86 the 
very fact that none were 5–4 or 6–3 (at least on the merits) decisions is 
strong evidence of the fact that these cases were applications of moder-
ately well-established formal doctrines, or at least of strong background 
principles. As subsequent and surrounding doctrinal developments 
have demonstrated, these cases were about as straightforward as Su-
preme Court constitutional decisions can be. The doctrines and prin-
ciples they applied were widely accepted across the Court’s political and 
ideological divisions, and even those Justices who might have preferred 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Bacchus at 268–69. 
82 See id. at 265, 268–69. 
83 See id. at 273. 
84 See id. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Sandra Day 
O’Connor, dissented, but on the grounds that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the 
states to engage in what would otherwise be constitutionally prohibited protectionism. See 
id. at 278–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
85 See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 272–73 (majority opinion). 
86 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 404 (1985). The principal 
reason that truly easy cases are rarely decided by the Supreme Court is that the “selection 
effect” often keeps such cases from being disputed; or, if disputed, keeps them from going 
to litigation; or, if in litigation, keeps them from being tried to verdict; or, if the subject of 
a verdict, keeps them from being appealed. On the selection effect generally, the phe-
nomenon by which difficult cases are disproportionately litigated, the seminal article is 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 
1 (1984). For a useful and accessible overview, see generally Leandra Lederman, Which 
Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
315 (1999). For application to the Supreme Court and constitutional litigation, see gener-
ally Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1717 (1988). 
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a different doctrinal path appeared to agree that the cases were de-
cided on the basis of what were by then accepted doctrinal foundations. 
 Second, and more importantly for present purposes, none of the 
officials who initiated or supported the governmental actions in these 
cases fit the mold of the corrupt, self-dealing, power-grabbing, or oth-
erwise non-publicly-interested public official so prominent in constitu-
tional iconography. The police in Hammon, for example, were not 
rogue cops seeking something close to vigilante justice or acting out 
racist motivations. Rather, they and the prosecutors appeared to be re-
sponding in good faith to the serious national problem of domestic vio-
lence and to the well-documented under-prosecution of such cases be-
cause of the frequent unwillingness of victims to cooperate with the 
prosecution. Similarly, the judge in Palmore seems to have been no rac-
ist, and may well have only been reluctant to conscript young children 
as front-line soldiers in the battle against racism. And the Hawaii legis-
lature whose actions resulted in Bacchus appears only to have been en-
gaged in a desire to help a small local industry against typically large 
corporate out-of-state competition. 
 The same characterization fits the officials in the free speech cases 
as well. Although many free speech and free press cases do indeed in-
volve officials stifling their critics,87 or those whose views they simply 
find distasteful,88 none of the free speech cases described above are 
among them. Rather, the efforts against the Klan in Brandenburg, the 
Nazis in the Skokie cases, the homophobic protesters in Snyder, the pur-
veyors of violence in Brown, and the puppy torturers in Stevens all ap-
pear to have come from public officials who were acting in good faith 
to protect against what they honestly (and often accurately) perceived 
as genuine dangers. 
 Third, the policies that these well-meaning officials pursued were 
themselves at least plausibly sound policies, constitutional questions 
aside. As a matter of pure policy, and without engaging in a serious pol-
                                                                                                                      
87 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240–41, 251 (1936) (invalidating a tax 
on newspapers); see also Appellees’ Brief at 8–9, Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 
(1936) (No. 303), 1935 WL 32673 (arguing that the tax was designed to punish newspa-
pers that had publicly opposed the governor). 
88 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 567–68 (1974) (invalidating prosecution for the 
use of a flag for a harmless anti-war protest); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369, 
372 (1968) (upholding a conviction for the burning of a draft card); Kingsley Int’l Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 685, 689–90 (1959) (invalidating a stat-
ute prohibiting favorable portrayals of sexual immorality). 
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icy analysis,89 it is by no means unreasonable to think that it is sound 
policy to prosecute wife beaters and puppy torturers, prevent the har-
assment of grieving relatives of dead soldiers, compensate for the fi-
nancial deficits imposed on women by past stereotypes and discrimina-
tion, and guard against Nazis and the Klan. 
III. Two Concepts of Constitutionalism 
 If officials were angels, would constitutions be necessary? Perhaps 
yes. Although we might not want to think of the officials just described 
as angels, they were not devils. These examples appear to portray well-
meaning public officials trying to do the right thing for their primary 
constituencies, constituencies whose interests are far from illegitimate. 
It would be difficult, for example, to deny at least the plausibility of the 
desires of the Holocaust survivors to be protected against additional 
anguish, the military families to bury their relatives in peace, the Ha-
waiian pineapple farmers to use indigenous products in a commercially 
viable way, or the anti-domestic violence advocates to protect the vic-
tims of a far too commonly under-prosecuted crime. But in responding 
to these morally and politically legitimate desires, the public officials in 
these examples also rather clearly violated the Constitution. Indeed, 
and at least for purposes of this Article, we can even stipulate that the 
actions of these well-meaning officials were properly found unconstitu-
tional. In other contexts, we might ask whether the established doc-
trines that produced the easy cases just described were constitutionally, 
morally, politically, policy-wise, or otherwise sound. But this is not that 
context, and now the issue is determining what follows from the fact 
that even sound doctrines, straightforwardly applied, will invalidate the 
plausibly policy-sound actions of well-meaning officials. More specifi-
cally, what does this phenomenon say about constitutionalism itself? 
 In terms of constitutionalism, we ought to be neither surprised nor 
upset. Constitutionalism is best understood as imposing second-order 
constraints on first-order policy preferences, even when those first-
order preferences are sound. Just as at least part of law can be under-
stood in much the same way,90 constitutionalism is, at least in part, the 
                                                                                                                      
89 See generally Edith Stokey & Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 
(1978). 
90 This characterization is closest to the account of law prominently offered by Joseph 
Raz, an account emphasizing law’s common exclusion of otherwise morally legitimate 
reasons. See generally, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Mo-
rality (2d ed. 2009); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986); Joseph Raz, 
Practical Reason and Norms (1975). 
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same relationship applied to officials. Put another way, constitutional-
ism is a series of second-order rules that exclude a range of first-order 
policy reasons from official consideration—even those that might be 
otherwise sound. 
 To understand this alternative vision of constitutionalism, it is 
helpful to revisit the standard Madisonian vision of constitutionalism 
with which I began. According to the Madisonian and Hobbesian im-
age, the Constitution and constitutionalism keep bad people—the non-
angels—from doing bad things.91 With the caveat that the word “bad” 
should be taken with a grain of salt, the Madisonian vision of constitu-
tionalism is supported by the use of constitutional decision making to 
combat the racist practices underlying most of pre-Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation segregation92 and almost all of the post-Brown resistance to 
Brown.93 It is supported by the use of the Constitution to restrict the 
activities of out-of-control police officers and officials who seek to target 
unpopular religions, as in the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,94 or those who single out 
their critics for special burdens, as in the Court’s 1936 decision in Gros-
jean v. American Press Co.95 
 As the examples I have featured were designed to emphasize, and 
as briefly noted in the introduction to this Article, the alternative vision 
of constitutionalism does not stress the role of the Constitution in keep-
ing bad people from doing bad things, but instead emphasizes the role 
of the Constitution in keeping good people from doing good things, in 
the service of higher or longer-term goals. This alternative vision is cap-
tured in part by the idea of “rights as side constraints”96 and in part by 
                                                                                                                      
91 See The Federalist No. 51, at 290 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); 
supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54 
(1958), aff’g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (segregated municipal parks); Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955), rev’g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (segregated golf cours-
es); Mayor and City Council of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955), aff’g 220 F.2d 
386 (4th Cir. 1955) (segregated beaches). 
93 See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431–35 (1968) (holding that the 
school board’s “freedom-of-choice” plan that allowed students to choose which public 
school to attend was unconstitutional); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 220–25 
(1964) (holding that the school board’s closure of public schools was unconstitutional); 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5–12 (1958) (holding that school officials’ planned delay in 
implementing integration would be unconstitutional). 
94 See 508 U.S. 520, 525–28 (1993). 
95 See 297 U.S. 233, 240–41, 251 (1936); supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
96 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 28–33 (1974) (viewing rights as 
“moral constraints” that individuals are prohibited from violating in the pursuit of even 
legitimate goals). 
1896 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1881 
the similar idea of “rights as trumps.”97 Nothing in this vision, however, 
is exclusively or even primarily about rights. The vision is captured just 
as readily in dormant commerce clause cases such as Bacchus Imports, 
Ltd. v. Dias and separation of powers decisions such as the Supreme 
Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, which invalidate good faith at-
tempts to devise workable solutions to the problems of modern gov-
ernance.98 The same vision is also apparent in many decisions about 
congressional powers, at least on the theory that there may well be wise 
policies that are still beyond the powers of Congress to implement.99 
IV. Initial Implications 
 Many different consequences flow from this alternative vision of 
constitutionalism, one that sees constitutionalism as imposing second-
order constraints on the reasonable first-order policy decisions of rea-
sonable and well-meaning officials. And among the most important of 
these consequences is the fact that it is extraordinarily unlikely that ei-
ther policy makers or their constituents will genuinely accept and in-
ternalize these constitutional constraints. Importantly, this is an empiri-
cal claim, and not a logical or conceptual one. In theory, both citizens 
and officials could internalize these second-order constitutional con-
straints on their own first-order policy preferences, but as an empirical 
matter, this seems highly unlikely. Indeed, when we see the frequency 
with which officials appear to ignore constitutional limitations in the 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at xi, 364 (1977) (viewing rights 
as individual claims that have priority over the general welfare). 
98 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268–69, 273; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 923–28 (1983) (invalidating a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that 
authorized a unicameral legislative veto to override the Executive Branch’s decision to 
suspend an individual’s deportation). 
99 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing for invalidation of the Controlled Substances Act, which criminalized possession or 
manufacture of marijuana, in order to “protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from 
excessive federal encroachment”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601, 605 (2000) 
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act of 1984, which provided a civil cause of 
action for victims of gender-motivated violence, on the grounds that it exceeded Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforce-
ment Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited possession of firearms on school 
grounds, on the grounds that it exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power). As it turns 
out, examples of the exact phenomenon described in the text are somewhat hard to come 
by. The theoretical point seems obvious, but at least for Supreme Court cases we often see 
the invalidation—on grounds of lack of legislative power—of legislation that the invalidat-
ing judges might well have opposed as a matter of substantive policy. 
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pursuit of plausibly sound and certainly popular policies,100 we are jus-
tifiably skeptical of the possibility that uncoerced officials will internal-
ize constraints on what they sincerely and often accurately believe to be 
policies that are both wise and popular. 
 The problem of officials and constituents who fail to internalize 
constitutional constraints is presented most clearly in the context of First 
Amendment and criminal procedure issues. As exemplified recently by 
the child pornography101 and flag desecration102 cases, by United States v. 
Stevens,103 Snyder v. Phelps,104 and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n,105 described above, and by the earlier Klan106 and Nazi107 cases—a 
disproportionate number of First Amendment litigants are pretty miser-
able people with miserable things to say. Indeed, if we look back at the 
formative years of First Amendment doctrine, we can add the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who although hardly miserable in the way that the members 
of the foregoing list are, have certainly been highly unpopular—an un-
popularity assisted by, in the words of Zechariah Chafee, their “great 
religious zeal and astonishing powers of annoyance.”108 
 So too with criminal procedure, where it is hardly controversial to 
observe that most of those who claim violations of their Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendment rights have actually committed the crimes of 
which they are charged. And if they have not committed the crimes of 
which they are charged, it is again not particularly extravagant to ob-
                                                                                                                      
100 I have described many of these examples on multiple previous occasions. See Fre-
derick Schauer, The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 J. Legal Analysis 83, 89–91 
(2012); Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481, 481–82 
(2011); Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 
Ga. L. Rev. 769, 770–74 (2010); Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 11, 12–13 (2007). 
101 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002) (display of virtual child 
pornography); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 578–80 (1989) (creation of child 
pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751–52 (1982) (distribution of child por-
nography). 
102 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312–13 (1990) (right to burn American 
flag); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399–400 (1989) (same). 
103 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 466 (2010) (films depicting cruelty to an-
imals). 
104 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011) (picketing at a funeral). 
105 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011) (sale of violent 
video games to minors). 
106 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446–47 (1969) (speech threatening African-
Americans and Jews). 
107 See Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. 1978) 
(march celebrating Nazism). 
108 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 399 (Atheneum 
1969) (1941). 
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serve that defendants in criminal cases are disproportionately likely to 
have committed other crimes. 
 None of this is to say that the rights claimed by such speakers and 
criminal defendants are inappropriate. Far from it. Just as the rights in 
the First Amendment are designed to protect the popular and the un-
popular, so too are the rights in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments designed to protect the guilty as well as the innocent—in part 
because by protecting the guilty we protect the innocent as well, and in 
part because even the guilty are entitled to fair procedures. But to ob-
serve that many First Amendment litigants are deservedly unpopular 
and that most defendants in criminal cases are guilty of the crimes 
charged is to say that those who claim these rights are especially unlikely 
to attract the political or moral sympathy of officials or their constitu-
ents. The political power of the child pornographers, the flag-burners, 
the overt racists, the puppy torturers, and the guilty defendants is, to put 
it mildly, minimal. And once we appreciate this lack of political power, 
we can appreciate as well that the issue is about the extent to which offi-
cials are likely to internalize and apply second-order constitutional con-
straints on first-order policy choices that they and their constituencies 
believe to be correct, and that might ultimately produce unpopular 
winners and popular losers. Indeed, although the First Amendment and 
criminal procedure issues present the phenomenon of the unpopular 
constitutional winner with particular vividness, the phenomenon exists 
in many other areas. As described above, many other constitutional is-
sues arise in cases in which well-meaning and responsive officials make 
reasonable and sympathetic policy choices that are nevertheless ulti-
mately invalidated in the service of abstract constitutional values, values 
especially unlikely to be obvious either to officials or their constituen-
cies. 
V. Further Implications 
 One implication of the foregoing is that we might well have a 
healthy skepticism about recent enthusiasm for so-called “popular con-
stitutionalism,” the view that constitutional meaning is created by, de-
pendent on, or at least influenced by the views of the public.109 Before 
                                                                                                                      
 
109 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutional-
ism and Judicial Review 7–8 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 
2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 959, 959, 962 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 
Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 16–74 (2001) (same); Robert C. Post, 
The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
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accepting such an understanding of constitutionalism, however, it is 
appropriate to ask whether the public can reasonably be expected to 
understand, internalize, and apply rules, doctrines, and principles that 
negate their very own all-things-except-the-law-considered judgment 
about what to do and what policies to prefer. In theory it is possible. 
But if we understand the role of a constitution as imposing constraints 
on even wise policies proposed and implemented by even wise officials, 
then we can understand just how implausible it is to suppose that the 
public can do what it is that the pure theory of popular constitutional-
ism expects of it.110 
 Much the same can be said about “departmentalism,” the view that 
each branch of government should have its own constitutional inter-
pretive responsibilities.111 Operationally, departmentalism is thus com-
mitted to the view that although the Supreme Court can and should 
interpret the Constitution for its own purposes,112 the Court has no po-
sition of interpretive supremacy vis-à-vis the other branches.113 To the 
departmentalist, therefore, neither Congress nor the President need 
accept what the Court thinks the Constitution means when it conflicts 
with their own interpretative judgments.114 
 Yet as with popular constitutionalism, departmentalism exists in 
considerable empirical tension with the constraining version of consti-
tutionalism I offer here. Indeed, if we assume that people become offi-
cials in the first place either because they have especially strong views 
about policy or because they are especially sensitive to the opinions of 
their constituents, then it may follow that officials are no more likely, 
                                                                                                                      
Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5–8 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Consti-
tution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1, 17–30 (2003). 
110 See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1594, 1633–35 (2005) (reviewing Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 109). 
111 See generally Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 
Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998) (analyzing arguments for and against departmentalism); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L. 
Rev. 217 (1994) (adopting a form of departmentalism). 
112 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 985–86 (1987); 
see also Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Consti-
tution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 380, 380–81 (1988) (arguing that, in the face of public defiance 
of the Supreme Court’s authority, the Court interprets the meaning of the Constitution 
“on the basis of the Court’s effort to protect itself from what it perceives as illegitimately 
motivated disagreement”). 
113 See Meese, supra note 112, at 985–86. But see Rex E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1009, 1015–16 (1987) (arguing that Attorney General 
Edwin Meese, III’s 1986 Tulane University speech was not so sweeping as to “call for drastic 
devaluation of the Supreme Court”). 
114 See Meese, supra note 112, at 985–86. 
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and possibly less likely, than the citizenry to be willing or able to sup-
press their first-order policy views in favor of constitutional rules or val-
ues. It should thus come as little surprise that presidents often go with 
their preferred policies in the face of relatively clear legal or constitu-
tional constraints, and that Congress and other legislative bodies quite 
often do the same. 
 That officials will typically prefer what they think is wise policy or 
good politics over what they think the law requires, when the two di-
verge, is thus only to be expected. At times the divergence will be a 
product of the belief that the law is simply mistaken, morally or other-
wise, as with laws restricting the use of marijuana and other so-called 
“soft drugs,” and about laws prohibiting various sexual practices alleg-
edly in conflict with the majority’s moral notions. At other times, peo-
ple believe that the law’s mandates are mistaken because the law ap-
pears, by virtue of its generality, to have generated a poor result on 
some particular occasion.115 Many people who violate traffic laws, for 
example, do not object to traffic laws as such, nor even to the particular 
traffic laws they violate. Rather, they often believe that the traffic laws, 
because of their necessary generality, have caused a bad or silly result 
on some particular occasion, as with a speed limit that seems far too low 
on a clear, dry, and traffic-free Sunday morning, or a “Don’t Walk” sign 
that tells pedestrians to wait at the curb when there is no approaching 
car as far as the eye can see. 
 Whether the occasion is a belief that an entire law is wrong or only 
that a good law would produce a poor result under particular circum-
stances, people often find themselves in situations in which their all-
things-except-the-law-considered best judgment indicates one course of 
action and the law indicates another. And when the question is so for-
mulated, the research is consistent with the conclusion that the law 
seems to make little difference under such conditions. In one study, for 
example, researchers asked subjects whether they would, as a teacher, 
violate a rule (which in this context can be considered equivalent to the 
law) mandating so-called blind grading of papers when following the 
                                                                                                                      
115 Law is necessarily general, and by virtue of its generality will inevitably produce er-
roneous results on occasion. Aristotle first captured this idea, arguing that equity was the 
necessary method of “rectification” of the mistakes occasioned by the intrinsic imprecision 
of general rules and laws. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. V, at 139–41 ( J.A.K. 
Thomson & Hugh Tredennick trans., Penguin Group rev. ed. 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.). On 
the problem of rule-generated error, see generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the 
Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in 
Life (1991); Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003). 
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rule would produce injustice.116 And although the subjects professed to 
have general attitudes somewhat favoring rule adherence over rule-
independent positive outcomes, these general attitudes did not stand up 
in the face of a concrete example.117 When given a concrete example as 
opposed to asking for their abstract opinion, the subjects preferred the 
positive outcome to the rule-directed one.118 Indeed, this was so not 
only for lay subjects, but also for law students and lawyers.119 Law stu-
dents and lawyers were somewhat more inclined than those without le-
gal training to follow the rule, even when it produced what they per-
ceived to be an unjust result.120 Nevertheless, the subjects in all 
categories took their own sense of what was a just result to be more im-
portant than following what they perceived to be the governing law in 
the situation.121 Thus, this particular study not only suggests that there 
may be less law following for the sake of law than others have supposed, 
but also that abstract attitudes about the importance of law following 
may be less reliable as predictors of law following behavior than is often 
ssu
systematically over-estimated, even by the de-
cision makers themselves. 
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 Other studies have produced similar results. In one pair of studies, 
law students were found to be more willing to make decisions in accor-
dance with their own policy preferences than in accordance with the 
law, even when the law was clear, they were given incentives to follow 
the law, and even though they tended to believe that their policy pref-
erences should not and did not have any effect on their legal deci-
sions.123 Again, these studies indicate not only that being guided by law 
qua law is less prevalent than is often assumed, but also that the impor-
tance of legal guidance is 
 
116 N.J. Schweitzer et al., The Effect of Legal Training on Judgments of Rule of Law 
Violations (Mar. 5, 2008) (unpublished poster presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Jacksonville, Fl.) (on file with author). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.; see also N.J. Schweitzer et al., Rule Violations and the Rule of Law: A Factorial Survey 
of Public Attitudes, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 615, 634–35 (2007) (finding that survey participants 
demonstrated stronger rule-following preferences in response to abstract questions than in 
resolving concrete dilemmas). 
120 Schweitzer et al., supra note 116. 
121 Id. 
122 See id. 
123 Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Behind the Mask of Method: Political Orientation and Constitu-
tional Interpretive Preferences, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 502, 504–09 (2008); Joshua R. Fur-
geson et al., Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect Beliefs About Its Constitutionality? An Experi-
mental Test, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 219, 222–25 (2008). 
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 These conclusions are unsurprising. We know that preferences in-
fluence judgments, the overall phenomenon being what psychologists 
call “motivated reasoning.”124 The more specific application of this 
overall phenomenon is the tendency of legal decision makers, includ-
ing ordinary people deciding whether the law constrains their actions, 
to understand the law in light of their outcome preferences.125 Indeed, 
this was the basic claim of the American Legal Realists, who argued that 
judges often understood and interpreted the law in light of their non-
legally-determined outcome preferences.126 Others have more recently 
made similar claims.127 And thus to the extent that both lay and legally-
trained people tend to treat the law as less important than their law-
independent judgments, the empirical foundations of the notion of the 
law operating as a coercion-independent external constraint on peo-
ple’s preferred courses of action becomes even more attenuated. 
 Once we absorb the implications of these various perspectives and 
studies, we can see that the notion of a constitution as restricting the 
well-meaning “angels” as well as the non-angels—and as limiting wise 
policies as well as unwise ones—has implications extending beyond 
questioning popular constitutionalism and departmentalism. Indeed, 
these implications extend even beyond supporting a regime of strong 
judicial review or providing an argument for judicial interpretive su-
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premacy.128 More specifically, understanding the Constitution’s con-
straints on wise policies, and the difficulty of officials or the public of 
internalizing those constraints, supports the necessity of a genuinely 
coercive enforcement mechanism for implementing the Constitution. 
VI. Coercing Constitutional Compliance 
 When we think about external and coercive enforcement of con-
stitutional rules, we are tempted to think that such mechanisms are al-
ready in place. After all, state officials who violate the constitution are 
subject to civil actions under the Civil Rights Act and related statutes,129 
and federal officials are similarly vulnerable to so-called Bivens actions if 
they violate the Constitution to the detriment of individual rights.130 
But various principles of immunity make a wide range of officials effec-
tively out of the reach of such remedies,131 even apart from the political 
considerations that make even technically available civil and criminal 
remedies quite rare. As just one obvious example, if state or federal law 
enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting 
searches without either a warrant or probable cause, they are poten-
tially personally liable in civil rights or Bivens actions.132 But if Congress 
or a state legislature explicitly authorizes those officials to violate the 
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Fourth Amendment in this way, the legislators are subject to no formal 
sanctions whatsoever.133 
 In the example just mentioned, one might think that the remedies 
would be at the ballot box, and that legislators who violate the Constitu-
tion in such a way could and would be punished electorally. But the 
lesson to be drawn from the previous several Parts of this Article is that 
such consequences would be extremely unlikely given the first-order 
policy considerations stemming from such actions. When constitutional 
rules constrain well-meaning officials serving the immediate public in-
terest in at least a plausible way, expecting the very public whose imme-
diate interests are being served to punish the officials who have done so 
goes well beyond wishful thinking. 
 It is at this point that we must confront directly the question of co-
ercion. If constitutional constraints are often pitted against popular and 
otherwise sound policies, then it is unreasonable to expect either offi-
cials or their constituents to prefer the constitutional rule to the sound 
policy unless they are forced to do so. Indeed, this much has been rec-
ognized in the context of civil rights actions and Bivens remedies. But in 
the absence of such remedies for higher officials, for legislators, and for 
various other officials shielded by immunity, it is quite possible that an 
important dimension of constitutionalism rests on little more than em-
pirically unsupported hope. 
 Indeed, when we look at data on actual legal compliance in other 
contexts, we find substantial support for the hypothesis that unenforced 
law that does not track people’s law-independent preferences and 
judgments—including moral judgments—is often quite ineffective. For 
example, before computers facilitated the process of tracking down 
people who did not appear in court in response to citations for traffic 
violations, the non-appearance rate was 60%, even though in such cases 
the legal “command” was directed to a particular person to engage in 
the particular act of showing up in court.134 Much the same can be said 
about people who are individually summoned to appear for jury duty, 
where compliance rates absent stringent sanctions have been found to 
be as low as 20% and are often in the 30–40% range.135 Similarly, the 
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scofflaw rate for parking meters in Los Angeles was 50% in 2011,136 and 
official reports indicate that compliance rates for mandatory dog li-
censes are often below 20%, and perhaps as low as 1% or 2% for cat li-
censes.137 In addition, noncompliance with high occupancy vehicle lane 
laws was as high as 89% in Australia,138 and it was estimated at over 50% 
in the United States.139 Similarly, fare evasion in cities and countries 
with so-called honor systems of fare collection on public transport has 
been reported at equivalently high rates.140 And one study found that 
under circumstances of low enforcement, the degree of compliance 
with a law prohibiting tobacco sales to minors in Hong Kong was below 
9%.
the taxpayer from automatic payments, such as the common and re-
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 Much of the most interesting data comes from studies about com-
pliance with tax laws. There is a tendency in much of the tax compli-
ance literature to refer to taxpayer-provided information and payments 
as “voluntary”142 in order to distinguish such reporting and payments by 
 
136 Bill Vidonic, Parking-Meter Scofflaws Owe City $11 M, Pitt. Trib.-Rev., June 25, 2011, 
at B1, B7. 
137 See Joan Miller, The Cat Financiers’ Ass’n, Why Is CFA Opposed to Cat Li-
censing? 2 (2004), http://www.pacificanimal.org/news/Why%20is%20CFA%20opposed 
%20to%20cat%20licensing.pdf (cat licenses); Scott Stringer, Led Astray: Reforming 
New York City’s Animal Care and Control 2 (2013), http://www.mbpo.org/uploads/ 
FINALedAstray.pdf (dog licenses); Daniel Kaas, Deputy Comm’r, Div. of Envtl. Health, 
Increasing Fee for Dog Licensing and Prohibiting Pet Owners from Restraining Animal 
Outdoors: Hearing on Intro. 328 and Intro. 425 before the N.Y. City Council Comm. on 
Health 3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (dog licenses); Mandatory Pet Licensing, Animal Outreach of 
Shelby County. (May 15, 2010), http://www.shelbycats.com/2010/05/mandatory-pet-
licensing/ (cat licenses). 
138 Stuart Lyndon et al., Australasian Transport Research Forum, High Occu-
pancy Vehicle Lane Enforcement: A Successful Trial in Brisbane by Adding a Splash 
of Magenta 5 (Sept. 2011), http://www.atrf11.unisa.edu.au/Assets/Papers/ATRF11_0150_ 
final.pdf. 
139 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 Ind. L.J. 1231, 1242 n.52 (2000). 
140 When Los Angeles County, for example, attempted to operate its subway system 
without active enforcement of the law requiring payment of the fare, a majority of people 
did not pay, causing the transit authority to give up the experiment and install turnstiles. 
See Ronald V. Clarke et al., Deterrence and Fare Evasion: Results of a Natural Experiment, 23 
Security J. 5, 7 (2010); LA Subway Installs First Turnstiles, Bos. Globe, May 4, 2013, at A2. 
141 Ming-yue Kan & Maggie Lau, Tobacco Compliance Check in Hong Kong, 10 Nicotine & 
Tobacco Res. 337, 338 (2008); see Ming-yue Kan & Maggie Lau, Minor Access Control of Hong 
Kong Under the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 95 Health Pol’y 204, 205 (2010) 
(finding that as a result of increased enforcement, compliance had risen from 18.9% in 2006 
to 27% in 2008). 
142 See, e.g., Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and 
Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1515, 1522–23; Leandra Lederman, The Interplay 
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1455 (2003). 
1906 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1881 
quired practice of withholding taxes from salary payments.143 But failing 
to report income is a crime, as is intentionally failing to pay the taxes 
that are due.144 And even if the level of culpability does not rise to the 
criminal, underpayment of taxes typically brings substantial civil penal-
ties.145 As a result, so-called “voluntary” tax compliance is voluntary only 
in the same way that someone voluntarily chooses to drive under the 
speed limit rather than be stopped by the police and required to pay a 
fine, or in the way that a would-be thief voluntarily refrains from theft in 
order to avoid imprisonment. In some sense, it is true that someone 
who chooses compliance rather than punishment has made a voluntary 
choice, but to describe an act of legal compliance under threat of pun-
ishment for noncompliance as voluntary seems inconsistent with our 
ordinary understanding of voluntariness and is certainly inconsistent 
with our effort here to focus on coercive dimensions of law. 
 If we put aside the confusing connotations of the word “voluntary,” 
however, we discover that genuinely uncoerced compliance with the tax 
laws is hardly common.146 In the United States, many forms of income 
are reported directly by the payor to federal tax authorities, and as a 
result, the opportunities for undetected evasion are small.147 But for 
income neither withheld nor directly reported in this manner—income 
not subject to information reporting, as it is commonly put, and thus 
for income whose existence is known primarily by the taxpayer— esti-
mates of rates of noncompliance range from fifty percent upward, de-
spite taxpayer knowledge that failing to report is a crime involving seri-
ous penalties.148 Although rates of tax compliance vary greatly across 
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countries, these figures are hardly atypical internationally.149 Indeed, 
the data from the United States suggest that truly uncoerced and un-
threatened obedience to the tax laws is far rarer than the image of the 
puzzled person would suggest.150 
 This collection of data appears to support the conclusion that 
when sanctions are removed from the equation, and when the laws do 
not track people’s salient and law-independent sense of what they 
ought to do, compliance with the law just because it is the law is a far 
less widespread phenomenon than H.L.A. Hart, with his reference to 
the puzzled person,151 and Tom Tyler, in presupposing that people do 
obey the law,152 assume. Indeed, looking carefully at Tyler’s reference 
to “law-related behavior” is particularly instructive. Behavior can be law-
related if it correlates with law, even if it is not caused by law, and it can 
also be law-related if it is caused by the sanctions that accompany the 
law—or a perception of those sanctions—and not the sanction-
independent internalization of a legal norm as a norm of behavior. But 
when we remove the instances in which we see correlation but probably 
not causation, and when we remove sanctions, we are left with an em-
pirical claim about the prevalence of obedience to law qua law that ap-
pears not to be supported by the available evidence. 
 There is little reason to believe that the situation is any different 
with respect to the Constitution. If uncoerced obedience to law is less 
common for ordinary people than is sometimes assumed, we should not 
be surprised to discover that uncoerced obedience to law for officials is 
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similarly less common than ubiquitous “rule of law” rhetoric supposes. 
Uncoerced obedience to the Constitution may thus be similarly rare, at 
least when the Constitution is in its regulative, and not constitutive 
mode, and at least when what the Constitution requires diverges from 
an official’s all-things-except-the-Constitution-considered judgment. 
Conclusion 
 In his memorable essay on civil disobedience, Henry David Tho-
reau observed that “[i]t is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the 
law, so much as for the right.”153 Thoreau was being prescriptive and 
aspirational, but over time he may have turned out to be descriptively 
accurate. At least in the United States, and perhaps especially in the 
United States, people and the officials they choose appear to prefer 
“the right” to the law when the two diverge. And in a world that counts 
the Nuremburg trials as part of its history, it should be obvious that pre-
ferring the right to the law is occasionally necessary. But to the extent 
that the Constitution is law, and to the extent that constitutional gov-
ernance requires that officials, at least presumptively even if not abso-
lutely, prefer the law of the Constitution to their own possibly mistaken 
conception of the good, the prescience of Thoreau’s comment looms 
large. If officials are inclined to prefer the right to the law, and if their 
constituents support them in that choice, then reclaiming the occa-
sional virtues of preferring the law of the Constitution to the often-
mistaken policy preferences of officials may require that we take the 
mechanisms of constitutional coercion more seriously than has most 
recently been fashionable. It may also require, however, that we con-
sider whether the mechanisms of constitutional coercion that we rou-
tinely apply to lower level officials should be extended to those higher 
officials whose actions may be far more consequential. 
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